The financial professional take on “The Lead” newsletter series is dedicated to help financial professionals stay informed about developments, and movements in private capital investing.
Bottom-line upfront
- Private credit's structural role in stabilizing capital markets over more than four decades provides a substantive rebuttal to cyclical concerns.
- Direct lending's funding model, anchored by long-term institutional capital rather than short-term deposits, structurally reduces the capital flight risk that amplified past credit crises.
- Consistent premium yields delivered through multiple market disruptions since the Global Financial Crisis offers a historically grounded case for middle market private credit as an income-generating allocation.
Questioning the "late cycle" narrative
As investment professionals field client questions about credit cycle risk and the durability of private market allocations, the following analysis offers context and talking points grounded in how direct lending has functioned across more than four decades of financing conditions.
"We are late in the credit cycle." What is often a throw-away line preceding some dire market prediction should be questioned. Are we measuring from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)? Are we ignoring the multiple speed bumps, including Covid-19, bank failures, tariffs, and rate shock, since then?
Regardless, a major sustained downturn since 2008–09 has not materialized. Clearly central bank intervention at every liquidity crunch has been a major factor. But we also believe private credit has played a significant role in the stability of capital markets.
How private credit has calmed the cycle
The Financial Times cited a paper on how the asset class "calmed the cycle." Rather than concerns that "private credit could amplify credit supply shocks," it states: "our results indicate that private credit may dampen the corporate credit cycle. [This has] important implications for assessing the financial stability ramifications of the rapid growth in private credit."
So, how has the cycle been calmed? Direct lending has rewired how credit is being accessed, managed, and absorbed by the financial system. It has increasingly served as the lender of last resort for middle market firms when the broadly syndicated loan (BSL) market shuts down. Consolidation and regulation pushed banks from storing leveraged loans to moving them to collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and retail funds. If those buyers were risk-off, public markets closed.
Financing channels only remained open because private capital had raised ample dry powder from long-term institutional investors. Corporate borrowers could then finance their growth and operations regardless of macro headwinds.
Structural differences that matter for capital stability
Often overlooked is the fact that even having strengthened their Tier One capital over the past decade, banks carry significantly more balance sheet leverage, at about 10x versus Tier One capital. Non-banks are a different story. Business development companies (BDCs), for example, are subject to a statutory leverage limit of 2x debt-to-equity but tend to operate well below that limit and closer to 1x.
One of the hallmarks of past crises is "flighty" capital. But direct lenders match their assets with long-term liabilities anchored by institutional capital with long investment horizons. Banks, by contrast, fund themselves with deposits and short-term borrowings, the very definition of duration mismatch.
Yes, retail redemptions ticked up over recent quarters, but gates exist precisely for moments like these, preventing a destabilizing "run" and protecting investors who stay the course. Meanwhile, institutional investors including insurance companies, pension plans, and sovereign wealth funds are not just supporting private allocations; they are expanding them.
A 40-year track record, and why the systemic risk narrative misreads it
None of this means the credit cycle is dead. Rates, inflation, and growth still matter. But core middle market lending didn't spring into existence overnight. It has been fully functioning in all financing weather for more than forty years and delivered consistent premium yields to investors. Its rapid growth brought intense media scrutiny, and a narrative that private credit is the next systemic fault line.
But direct lending is the Steadi-Cam of the capital markets. If there is another recession, it could well be one of the reasons that downturn proves less damaging than the last.
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Private credit investments are illiquid. Investors should expect limited or no ability to access capital during the investment period, which may span multiple years. These investments carry credit risk, default risk, and the potential for loss of principal. They are not appropriate for investors who may require near-term liquidity. Private credit investments are suitable only for investors with long investment horizons, high risk tolerance, and the financial capacity to bear illiquidity and potential loss of principal. Advisors should evaluate suitability on an individual client basis. The illiquidity of private credit investments is a defining and non-negotiable characteristic of the asset class. Lock-up periods, limited redemption windows, and the absence of a secondary market for most private credit instruments mean that investors may have no ability to access capital for the duration of the investment period. Advisors should ensure clients fully understand these terms before any allocation is made. Private credit investments are not appropriate for investors who may require near-term liquidity. Past performance of private credit strategies is not indicative of future results. The risks associated with private credit include, but are not limited to, credit risk, default risk, concentration risk, interest rate risk, geopolitical risk, sector-specific disruption risk (including technology and AI-driven disruption), and the risk of loss of principal. Experienced managers actively manage these risks, but management experience does not eliminate the possibility of investment loss.